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Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the Public
Schools
Wendy Mahling
Throughout the United States, dress codes have gained
increasing popularity in public schools.1 The types of dress codes
imposed vary greatly. Justifications for dress codes vary as
well, and include promoting student self-respect,3 maintaining
discipline in the classroom,4 discouraging peer pressure to buy
expensive clothing,5 and making the classrooms and students
safer.6
While maintaining an environment conducive to education
is within the power of school authorities,7 using dress codes to
1. See generally Maa Davis, Fashion Furor: Tougher School Dress Codes
Raise Questions of Safety and Rights, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1994, at B1 (noting
the spread of dress codes from gang-ridden urban sites to low-crime suburban
areas); Michel Marriott, Uncool for School, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at 9-1
(discussing the debate surrounding dress codes in various U.S. cities); Sandra
Sardella, Uniformity: Schools Adopt Dress Codes to Eliminate Distractions,
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 15, 1995, at 6 (describing the success of a Boston-area
school's voluntary dress code); Cassandra Spratling, Mumford Ban on Expensive
Clothes Styles Linked to Drugs Is Criticized, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 3,1988,
at 6A (tracing the various incidents that led a Detroit public school to adopt a
dress code).
2. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing the various
dress codes imposed in public schools).
3. See Sardella, supra note 1 (discussing how uniforms may improve self-
esteem because kids tend not to tease each other about their clothes).
4. See Alicia Doyle, Uniforms Seem Popular, but ACLU Objects, L_.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at B2 (describing several educators' opinions on how
uniforms and dress codes affect the classroom).
5. See Sardella, supra note 1 (describing how uniforms may lessen peer
pressure on students to buy expensive clothing).
6. See Davis, supra note 1 (describing school officials' arguments that
dress codes prohibiting gang-related clothing make schools safer).
7. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (explaining that current
constitutional jurisprudence considers maintaining an environment conducive
to education to be within public school administrators' authority).
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achieve this result creates significant controversy. Some dress
codes appear to infringe on important freedom of speech and
expression rights guaranteed under the Constitution.9 As such,
civil liberties groups, ° students," and parents 2 have expressed
concern over some dress codes, questioning whether dress codes
violate the First Amendment by regulating student expression."
Despite these concerns, some states have specifically authorized
the adoption of dress codes in public schools 4 and numerous
school districts have imposed dress codes in the public schools,
8. Jodi Wilgoren, O.C. Districts Fashion Strict New Dress Codes, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at Al (Orange Cty. ed.).
9. In Oakland, for example, the school board banned clothing and jewelry
noting identification with a gang; expensive jogging suits; all hats, headgear
and clothing designating membership in non-school organizations; and T-shirts
with profanity, approval of drug use or violence, or denigration of people based
on their race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or sexual preference. Katherine Bishop,
Schools Order Students to Dress for Safety's Sake, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at
A18.
10. See Doyle9 supra note 4 (explaining the ACLU's objections to certain
dress code provisions); Richard Leiby, Clothed in Controversy, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 1994, at C1 (recounting the story of a 16-year-old gay transvestite who
hired a civil rights attorney to help him assert his right to graduate in drag).
11. E.g., Travis L. Moon, Youth Opinion:A Conflict Between Freedom, Order
in Schools, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at B4 (arguing that dress codes seek to
control student expression).
12. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 1 (reporting some parents' concerns that
dress codes take away their children's freedom and responsibility). But see
George G. Figneroa, Youths Could Make a Fatal Mistake if They're Dressed to
Kill, L-. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at B19 (Valley ed.) (arguing that dress codes are
necessary for student safety); Mark Mathabane, Appearances Are Destructive,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at A21 (arguing that dress codes pervade everyone's
life and are necessary in the school environment to keep the focus on academics,
not clothes).
13. See Bishop, supra note 9 (reporting that the ACLU has contested some
bans on T-shirts with writing on them).
14. For example, the California legislature passed a statute declaring that
dress codes are appropriate and permissible in California public schools when
they are aimed at decreasing violence in schools or improving the educational
environment. The statute provides:
The governing board of any school district may adopt or rescind a
reasonable dress code policy that requires pupils to wear a school-wide
uniform or prohibits pupils from wearing "gang-related apparel" if the
governing board of the school district approves a plan that may be
initiated by an individual school's principal, staff, and parents and
determines that the policy is necessary for the health and safety of the
school environment. Individual schools may include the reasonable
dress code policy as part of its school safety plan, pursuant to Section
35294.1.
Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
716
SCHOOL DRESS CODES
including school districts in Detroit, 5 New York,16 Oakland,"
and Washington, D.C."8
This Note addresses the constitutionality of public school
dress codes. Part I examines various dress codes and school
districts' arguments that dress codes ensure a safe and produc-
tive educational environment. Part II examines freedom of
expression jurisprudence and the extent to which students may
exercise this constitutional right. This Part also discusses the
disagreement among the federal circuit courts, which considered
the constitutionality of dress codes as they applied to students'
hair length. Part Ill argues that the constitutionality of public
school dress codes should be examined under the First Amend-
ment and proposes a method for balancing school officials'
authority to maintain an educational environment against
students' First Amendment rights. This Note concludes that
while school dress codes are not outside the scope of judicial
review, under the inculcative theory of public school education 9
public school administrators have broad authority to proscribe
student expression such as dress if administrators determine the
expression disrupts the classroom or threatens school safety.
I. PUBLIC SCHOOL DRESS CODES AND SCHOOL
OFFICIALS' JUSTIFICATIONS
Americans express increasing alarm over a perceived decline
in the quality of public school education and a concurrent
increase in the level of violence and crime in schools. 20 To
counter the physical risk to children and to increase the quality
of education, several public schools have adopted dress codes.2'
In public schools where violence is the perceived problem, dress
15. Spratling, supra note 1.
16. Bishop, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. See Shaun Sutner, Dress Code Left to Principals: Board Decides to Make
School Uniforms Voluntary This Fall, WASH. POST, June 27, 1991, at J8
(explaining Washington D.C.'s mandatory dress code requirement).
19. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the various
models describing the nature of public school education).
20. Paul D. Murphy, Restricting Gang Clothing in Public Schools: Does a
Dress Code Violate a Student's Right of Free Expression?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1321, 1323-24 (1991); Judy Pasternak, Gang Tension:At School, Survival Comes
First, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1989, at Al.
21. See supra notes 2-9 and infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text
(noting the range of dress codes adopted in cities throughout the United States).
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codes tend to prohibit gang-related clothing22 such as jewelry,
insignias, baseball caps, gloves, and certain colors of clothes,'
as well as expensive clothing.' Other public schools prohibit
spandex and other clothing with a sexual tone which school
officials believe disrupts the classroom.25 Some public schools
have mandatory uniforms or dress codes," others use a volun-
tary system, 7 while others proscribe certain types of cloth-
ing.28
Although dress codes are increasing in popularity through-
out the United States, educators do not uniformly agree upon
the benefits produced by these regulations.29 There is no
certainty that dress codes reduce school violence or improve
academic achievement.3" Furthermore, strict dress codes,
which school officials justify because they are aimed at prevent-
ing gang violence, have been adopted in several areas that do
not have gang problems,"' undermining some school officials'
justifi-cations. Moreover, dress codes may contain an inherent
22. The dress code in central Los Angeles prohibits such gang-related
clothing as voluminous, brightly-colored pants and colored shoe strings. Bishop,
supra note 9.
23. Murphy, supra note 20, at 1323-24.
24. Bishop, supra note 9.
25. See, e.g., Alicia Di Rado, SDS Resurfaces, This Time for a New
Generation, L.A. TIMfES, May 9, 1994, at B1 (describing students' responses to
Huntington Beach Union High School District's dress code, which prohibits
clothes with a sexual tone as well as tattoos); Margaret Trimer, Weather Is
Warm and School Clothes Hot: Sizzling Spandex Barred by Dress Code, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Apr. 25, 1990, at 1A (reporting on the public school dress code in
Lake Orion banning spandex among other things).
26. See Wilgoren, supra note 8 (enumerating the wide range of regulations
on student dress imposed by school districts in Orange County).
27. Id.
28. See Bishop, supra note 9 (describing prohibitions in the New York and
Oakland school districts on expensive clothing and jewelry).
29. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (describing school officials'
and educators' views on the benefits of dress codes).
30. Davis, supra note 1. Pedro Noguera, Professor of Education at the
University of California at Berkeley, states that he has "never seen any study
that showed a connection between style of dress and academic achievement."
Id.
31. For example, Oak Park School District in California bans gang-related
attire even though the affluent community has no gang problem. Davis, supra
note 1. In addition, Santa Catalina Island schools have instituted dress codes
aimed at reducing gang violence and improving academic performance despite
the fact that there have been no gang problems among the Island's approximate
640 students. James Benning, Importing Mainland Dress Code, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1994, at J3.
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racial bias because they tend to focus on clothing associated with
African-American gangs while ignoring other groups such as
white supremist gangs.32
In fact, some important educational goals may be under-
mined by dress codes.33 By restricting student speech, dress
codes may undermine a fundamental value of American society
that public schools should be seeking to teach students, namely
freedom of expression."' Furthermore, some educators contend
that suppressing free speech in the public schools actually
interferes with students' cognitive development.3
In contrast, school officials who favor dress codes often
contend that they reduce classroom violence and improve the
educational environment. 6 Dress code proponents frequently
32. Murphy, supra note 20, at 1356.
33. See Robert B. Keiter, Judicial Review of Student First Amendment
Claims: Assessing the Legitimacy-Competency Debate, 50 Mo. L. REV. 25, 34
(1985) (explaining that one of the major values attributed to the First
Amendment, ensuring individual participation in the governmental decision-
making process, is particularly important in the context of student speech since
students' participation is limited until they reach voting age).
34. Id.
35. See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools
as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1308-18 (1991) (arguing that
the inculcative model of education which allows student speech to be regulated
interferes with students' cognitive development).
36. The California legislature agreed that dress could affect the quality of
the education received in the classroom when it adopted Cal. Educ. Code
§ 35183 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). The statute makes dress codes and uniforms
permissible in California public school and declares:
(1) The children of this state have the right to an effective public
school education. Both students and staff of the primary, elementary,
junior and senior high school campuses have the constitutional right
to be safe and secure in their persons at school. However, children in
many of our public schools are forced to focus on the threat of violence
and the messages of violence contained in many aspects of our society,
particularly reflected in gang regalia that disrupts the learning
environment.
(2) "Gang-related apparel" is hazardous to the health and safety of the
school environment.
(3) Instructing teachers and administrators on the subtleties of
identifying constantly changing gang regalia and gang affiliation takes
an increasing amount of time away from educating our children.
(4) Weapons, including firearms and knives, have become common
place upon even our elementary school campuses. Students often
conceal weapons by wearing clothing, such as jumpsuits and overcoats,
and by carrying large bags.
(5) The adoption of a school-wide uniform policy is a reasonable way
to provide some protection for students. A required uniform may
protect students from being associated with any particular gang.
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assert that dress codes prevent students who are not involved
with gangs from mistakenly being targeted as a gang member
because of their dress.3" In addition, some educators report
that dress codes reduce the number of fights in schools.3"
Many educators who promote the establishment of dress codes
also assert that dress codes improve the educational environ-
ment of the classroom by encouraging discipline, 9 enhancing
self-esteem, 40 and promoting unity in the educational pro-
cess.
41
Parents and students are divided over the advantages of
dress codes as well.42  In particular, many parents and stu-
dents, as well as some educators, question whether dress codes
Moreover, by requiring school-wide uniforms teachers and administra-
tors may not need to occupy as much of their time learning the
subtleties of gang regalia.
(6) To control the environment in public schools to facilitate and
maintain an effective learning environment and to keep the focus of
the classroom on learning and not personal safety, schools need the
authorization to implement uniform clothing requirements for our
public school children.
(7) Many educators believe that school dress significantly influences
pupil behavior. This influence is evident on school dress-up days and
color days. Schools that have adopted school uniforms experience a
"coming together feeling," greater school pride, and better behavior in
and out of the classroom.
Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
37. See Davis, supra note 1 (reporting a youth services officer's claim that
police respond daily to incidents of young people who are assaulted based on the
clothes they were wearing); Renee Tawa, A New Fashion Statement, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1993, at J1 (describing San Gabriel Valley public school dress codes
aimed at preventing students from becoming victims of mistaken identity in
gang violence).
38. See Murphy, supra note 20, at 1332 n.56 (reporting an interview in
which a principal claimed dress codes lowered the number of incidents of
fighting in school).
39. See id. at 1332 n.57 (reporting an interview in which an educator stated
that dress codes gave him authority over the classroom); see also Davis, supra
note 1 (explaining that the superintendent of the Ventura Unified School
District agrees that student dress affects student behavior).
40. Doris Benson Jones, Professor of School Psychology at Cal State
Northridge, asserts that "students' esteem, image and behavior all relate to
their appearance.... A dress code can be very positive in terms of unity....
It could enhance self-esteem and minimize gangs and... can create a more
global sense of commitment to the educational process." Doyle, supra note 4.
41. See id. (quoting Professor Jones, who stated her belief in "a sense of
unity when everyone wears the same clothes").
42. See Moon, supra note 11 (arguing that school administrators are using
the current concern with violence in schools as a justification for unnecessary
dress codes); Sardella, supra note 1 (reporting students' negative as well as
positive reactions to the new dress code).
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are actually aimed at instituting school officials' personal
preferences in dress.43 In light of the controversy concerning
whether dress codes produce the beneficial results that justify
their implementation, the result of a challenge of these restric-
tions under the First Amendment remains questionable.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF EXPRESSION
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."" Despite the
strict language of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
not endorsed an absolute view of free speech that would prohibit
any government restriction of speech.45 Rather, the Court has
set forth varying tests to determine whether an individual's right
to freely express his or her beliefs must be subordinated to other
interests of society.
To aid in the determination of whether a governmental
regulation infringes on constitutionally protected speech, the
Court has developed numerous categories of speech,46 regu-
lations,4' forums," and speakers.49  Based on these catego-
43. Marriott, supra note 1 (noting that when school administrators mandate
"dress for success" codes, all students are forced to fit a stereotypical mold).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. JOHN E. NOWAK FT AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866 (5th ed. 1995).
46. Id. at 858; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudi-
cation, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (1984). A nonexhaustive list of these
categories includes fighting words, speech before a hostile audience, symbolic
speech, subversive speech, obscene speech, and libelous speech. NOWAK, supra
note 45, at 857-58.
47. Current First Amendment jurisprudence distinguishes between content-
neutral and content-based regulations to determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny for restrictions on speech. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727,727-
30 (1980) (arguing that the Supreme Court, in upholding a number of
restrictions related to speech content, has created two distinct tests to
determine the constitutionality of content-based regulation); Martin H. Redish,
The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113,
121-27 (1981) (observing that the Supreme Court has generally adhered to a
rule that speech restrictions that turn on the content of expression are subjected
to a strict form of judicial review, while restrictions concerned with matters
other than content receive more limited exami-nation); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,
189-97 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court's reliance on the content-
neutral, content-based distinction underprotects valuable speech).
Content-neutral regulations limit speech without regard to the underlying
1996] 721
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ries, the Court has created different tests to determine the scope
of permissible restrictions on different types of speech.5 °
message. Id. at 189-90. Content-neutral regulations include noise restrictions
near hospitals, billboard bans in residential neighborhoods, or license fees for
parades. Id. In contrast, content-based restrictions aim at regulating the
underlying message of pure speech and expressive conduct. Id. Content-based
regulations include the prohibition of the display of swastikas, seditious libel,
and the publication of confidential information. Id. Content-based regulations
contain the subgroup of viewpoint-based regulations, which go a step further to
proscribe the expression of particular ideas, views, or items of information. Id.
at 197.
48. Depending on where the regulated speech takes place, courts will apply
differing levels of scrutiny. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78
(1983) (describing the various levels of scrutiny that regulations affecting speech
receive depending on the location of the speech); United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (observing the
long-standing rule that "traditional public forums" for free speech are subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions); Farber & Nowak, supra
note 46, at 1220 ("Public forum analysis might well be called the 'geographical
approach' to first amendment law, because results often hinge almost entirely
on the speaker's location.").
49. Some restrictions apply not to what is spoken but to who participates
in the communication. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414-19
(1989) (upholding restrictions on inmate communication); Board ofEduc. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 863-72 (1982) (permitting book censorship in the public schools);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 n.8 (1980) (allowing restrictions on
"disrespectful and contemptuous" speech by military personnel); DANIEL A.
FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD
CENTuRY 695-701 (1993) (describing speech restrictions based on speaker
classification within government institutions).
50. Content-based regulations, including viewpoint-based regulations,
presumptively violate the First Amendment. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The First Amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on
particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of discussion of entire topic."); see
also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47-
48 (1987) (observing that the Supreme Court has invalidated almost every
content-based restriction it has considered in the last thirty years except those
restrictions concerning low-value speech); Note, The Content Distinction in Free
Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905-06 n.12 (1989)
(providing a survey of cases in which low-value speech or speech by corporations
received lesser protection by the Supreme Court). As such, courts subject
content-based regulations to strict scrutiny. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 412 (1989) (stating that speech which is restricted because of the content
of the message conveyed is subject to "the most exacting scrutiny"); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that when a state seeks to regulate
speech based on its content, it must show the "regulation is necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end").
For content-neutral regulations and time, place, and manner regulations
the speech must be justified by significant government interests and must leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981). In addition, the
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Hence, an analysis of dress codes in the public schools must first
consider whether the regulated speech receives protection 5' and
then examine the scope of that protection for public school
students. 52
A. CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS FOR THE REGULATION OF SPEECH:
DETERMINING WHETHER CONDUCT CONSTITUTES SPEECH
WORTHY OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A threshold question to determine the validity of govern-
ment regulations concerning speech is whether the speech is
"pure speech" or "symbolic speech"-that is, conduct intended to
convey a message. The First Amendment protects all "pure
speech."53 Some categories of pure speech, however, receive
less protection,54 such as obscenity55 or defamatory words.56
In contrast, "symbolic speech" receives First Amendment
protection only after surviving court examination.57
The Supreme Court has rejected the view that all conduct
in which a person engages intending to convey a message
constitutes symbolic speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.58 Instead, courts apply a two-part test which examines
whether "an intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message
Court has enunciated a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of
government regulations indirectly affecting freedom of speech. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (explaining the constitutional test
for determining the validity of regulations that indirectly affect speech); see also
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-90 (1985) (same); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (same); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976) (Powell, J. concurring)
(same).
51. See infra notes 59-71 and accompanying text (analyzing the constitu-
tional test for determining whether symbolic speech is protected speech under
the First Amendment).
52. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text (analyzing the scope of
students' First Amendment rights).
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
54. See Stone, supra note 47, at 194-95 (enumerating some of the categories
of speech receiving only limited constitutional protection). Other low-value
speech includes express incitement, commercial speech, and child pornography.
Id.
55. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1973) (holding that
obscene speech falls outside of the scope of the First Amendment's protection).
56. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1973) (holding that
the First Amendment's protection of defamatory speech is limited).
57. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-06 (1989).
58. Id. at 404 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
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would be understood by those who viewed it." 9
The context in which symbolic speech occurs determines to
a significant extent whether First Amendment protection
applies. For example, in Texas v. Johnson," the Supreme
Court used this two-part test"' to determine whether the
defendant's arrest under Texas's Desecration of a Venerated
Object statute 2 for burning a United States flag outside the
Republican National Convention violated the First Amend-
ment.63 In assessing whether the defendant engaged in commu-
nicative conduct, the Court examined the context in which the
conduct took place, such as the political climate as well as
current national events.' The Court found that the conduct
was intended to, and did, convey a message, although various
groups interpreted the message communicated by the
defendant's conduct differently.65 The differences in interpreta-
tion, however, did not place the conduct outside the scope of
59. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
60. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
61. Id. at 403.
62. Id. at 400 n.1 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989)). The
Desecration of a Venerated Object statute provided:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly
desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or
otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action.
Id.
63. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. Johnson's conduct did not physically
injure nor threaten to injure anyone, although several onlookers were offended
by his conduct. Id. Furthermore, Johnson was not convicted for disturbing the
peace, but rather for desecration of a venerated object which, under the statute,
included burning a national flag. Id.
64. Id. at 405-06.
65. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 406 (1989). The Court noted that
the defendant was participating in a demonstration dubbed the "Republican
War Chest Tour." Id. at 399. The demonstration protested certain policies of
the Reagan administration and dramatized the effects of nuclear war. Id.
During the demonstration, another protestor gave the defendant a flag, which
the defendant then burned. Id. The Court recognized that although the
purpose of burning the flag and the message conveyed to the protestors was the
protest of Reagan administration policies, the act of burning the flag offended
several onlookers. Id. at 408. Hence, a single act can have several meanings
depending on the viewers of the conduct.
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protected symbolic speech.66 Hence, First Amendment protec-
tion applied to the conduct.6
Likewise, some lower courts have recognized that dress may
constitute symbolic speech. For example, the Ninth Circuit held
that buttons worn on the lapel by students falls within the
Constitution's protection of symbolic speech." A district court
similarly held that a dress code prohibiting clothing with non-
vulgar, non-disruptive speech that "harassed" other students
impermissibly censored speech under the First Amendment.69
In contrast, other courts have found that dress is not sufficiently
communicative to constitute speech ' ° but may be protected by
a liberty interest in controlling one's own body.'
B. STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The First Amendment limits the government's ability to
regulate speech less stringently when public school students'
First Amendment rights are involved. Although students are
"persons" under the Constitution 2 and retain some constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech and expression while in public
schools, 3 the Supreme Court has held that these rights are
limited. 4 Because students' First Amendment rights are not
coextensive with those of adults, courts do not apply traditional
First Amendment jurisprudence when examining regulations
66. Id.
67. Id. at 406. Significantly, if the Court had found that the conduct was
not symbolic speech, First Amendment protection would not have applied.
68. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992).
69. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 172 (D. Mass.
1994).
70. See infra notes 101-128 and accompanying text (discussingthe differing
results reached by the federal circuit courts concerning the proper analysis for
examining the constitutionality of hair length regulations).
71. See East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 841-42
(2d Cir. 1977) (finding that there is a liberty interest in the right to control
one's body, including one's hair and dress).
72. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). The
Court explained: "[Students] are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate." Id.
73. Id. at 506.
74. See id. (recognizing that First Amendment rights are "applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment").
1996]
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affecting speech in the public schools. v5 Instead, courts exam-
ine the necessity of the regulation for maintaining the classroom
environment.
The Supreme Court has endorsed an inculcative theory of
public school education 7 -- that is, one in which public schools
impart school-supported knowledge and values. 77 Under this
theory, school authorities may proscribe student speech that
appears inconsistent with its "basic educational mission."7 8 &s
a result, schools can censor speech that could not be censored
outside the school.7" Significantly, the Court has held that
school boards are the proper decision-makers of what manner of
75. See infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text (discussing the guidelines
for examining regulations of student speech in the public schools).
76. See Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between
Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1648-
54 (1986) (contending that courts and society believe that the role of the public
schools is to transmit society's common values and beliefs to the next
generation); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and
Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 581 (1996) ("Public schools give rise to
a unique First Amendment conundrum. On the one hand, public schools play
an important, indeed vital, role in socializing and inculcating values in
students." (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)); Roe,
supra note 35, at 1276-92 (arguing that courts have adopted the view that the
work of the public schools is the inculcation of values).
77. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) ("The
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools
and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest
in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."); see also
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988) (holding that
school authorities do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in "school-sponsored
expressive activities" as long as "their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns").
78. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685. Although the Court has adopted an inculcative
theory of education under which to examine regulations of student speech,
several commentators have argued that the inculcative theory does not properly
reflect the role of the public schools in a democratic society. See Roe, supra note
35, at 1275-76 & n.18 (arguing that neither the inculcative nor marketplace
models properly describe the work of schools and advocating a "conceptual-
development" model that requires a higher level of tolerance for student
speech); Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental
Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 239-62 (1983) (arguing that
the inculcation of values is not an effective way to prepare children for
citizenship). But see Levin, supra note 76, at 1653-54 (arguing that the
inculcative model of education is satisfactory, but one value that must be taught
in a democratic society is freedom of expression).
79. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266.
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speech is consistent with their curricula," potentially limiting
the scope of judicial review for many public school regulations.
The Court has not given school districts free reign in
determining which speech is permissible in schools, however.
Public school administrators may not proscribe speech merely
because they disagree with the message of the speech or wish to
avoid the unpleasantness accompanying a particular point of
view.8' For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District,82 the Court found that the suspension of several
students for wearing black armbands" to protest the Vietnam
War violated the First Amendment. 4 In examining the sus-
pension, the Court first determined that personal intercommuni-
cation is an integral part of the educational process.85 Hence,
First Amendment rights apply in all situations in which students
seek to freely express themselves on the school campus, includ-
ing in the cafeteria, in hallways, or during extra-curricular
activities. 86
The Court held that in the absence of actual or likely
classroom disruption or violence on the school campus, the mere
fear of a disturbance caused by the wearing of armbands did not
justify the restrictions on students' speech." The Court stated
80. Id. at 267 (citing Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683); see also Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 852, 889-91 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that if, as
the Court has held, schools may legitimately be used as vehicles for inculcating
fundamental social and political values, "school authorities must have broad
discretion to fulfill that obligation").
81. Pico, 457 U.S. at 866, 870-71; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
82. 393 U.S. at 503.
83. The Court stated that wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War
was akin to "pure speech" entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment. Id. at 505-06.
84. Id. at 514.
85. Id. at 512.
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1989).
The Court stated:
[Intercommunication] is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field,
or the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions.
Id.
87. Id. at 508. The Court explained:
[Ulndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from
absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the
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that public school administrators may only impose regulations
proscribing expression when there is evidence that the regu-
lations are "necessary to avoid material and substantial interfer-
ence with schoolwork or discipline."88 Because school officials
provided no evidence that the passive wearing of armbands
caused any disruption in the classroom, the Court held that the
suspensions violated the First Amendment.89 Public schools, as
state actors, may not therefore suppress a particular expression
or opinion merely because of a desire to avoid the controversy
accompanying an unpopular view.90
Despite the Supreme Court's broad description of students'
First Amendment rights in Tinker, other cases appear to offer
far narrower protection for student rights to freedom of ex-
pression. The Court has found in several instances that First
Amendment protection does not apply to restrictions that do not
implicate political speech or a student's access to information.
For example, the Court has upheld a public school principal's
authority to remove an article discussing a teenager's pregnancy
from a school newspaper because he thought it was inappropri-
ate for younger students.9' In addition, the Court has upheld
school officials' right to discipline students for using lewd or
vulgar speech.92  Additionally, several lower courts have
determined that dress codes aimed at maintaining a good
educational environment do not violate the First Amendment.93
majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk.
Id.
88. Id. at 511.
89. Id. at 514.
90. Id. at 609.
91. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 261 (1988). The
Court differentiated between the standards that apply when schools punish
student expression that happens to occur on school premises and when schools
control "the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities." Id. School officials may regulate school-related speech "so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id.
92. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 677-80 (1986) (holding that a
school district may prevent a student from delivering a speech with sexual
overtones).
93. E.g., Fowler v. Williamson, 448 F. Supp. 497, 502 (W.D.N.C. 1978)
(holding that the Constitution does not bar a principal from preventing a
student who was wearingjeans from participating in commencement exercises).
But see Bannister v. Paradise, 316 F. Supp 185, 189 (D.N.H. 1970) (overturning
a school prohibition on wearing jeans to school because no disturbance, safety,
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In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that a school cannot
regulate speech merely because it disagrees with the content,
94
implying that the public school officials' motivations for regulat-
ing speech are relevant to the determination of the constitution-
ality of the regulations.95 Nonetheless, the Court has also found
that many school administrators' decisions concerning which
speech is consistent with the educational mission of the school
are beyond the scope of judicial review.96 As such, the scope of
students' First Amendment rights when they enter public school
grounds and the extent to which courts will enforce those rights
is uncertain.
C. EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO EXAMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF HAIR LENGTH REGULATIONS
Several circuit courts have considered the constitutionality
of public school dress codes that regulate the length of students'
hair. The circuit courts used different reasoning when examin-
ing these regulations and, accordingly, reached different
conclusions regarding their constitutionality 7 Some circuits
determined that the examination of public school dress codes is
not within the scope of federal judicial review.98 In contrast,
other circuits found that federal courts may properly review
public school dress codes regulating hair length,99 although
these circuits did not agree upon which constitutional grounds
or health factor was involved). Generally, courts review dress codes less strictly
than hair length regulations because hair is an integral part of one's body while
clothing can be changed. Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D. Ark.
1972).
94. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969).
95. See van Geel, supra note 78, at 232 (arguing that the Supreme Court
adopted a motivational test to determine whether school restrictions on speech
violated the First Amendment).
96. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (describing the authority
of school administrators to limit students' speech in order to maintain the
educational environment).
97. See infra notes 101-128 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit
courts' reasoning and results in hair length cases).
98. See, e.g., Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 606-07
(3d Cir. 1975) (holding that the federal court system is not the proper forum for
determining the appropriateness of public school grooming regulations); see also
infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuit court
decisions holding that federal courts should not review public school hair length
regulations).
99. See, e.g., Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[Cjourts
must judge the constitutionality of disciplinary action which denies a student
the opportunity to attend classes.").
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courts should examine dress codes in the public schools.'
1. The Hands-Off Approach
The Third,'' Fifth, °2  Sixth, 0 3 Ninth, 10 4  and
Tenth °5 Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the examina-
tion of hair length regulations is not properly within the scope
of federal judicial review. Although all of these circuit courts
have held that hair length regulations do not implicate sufficient
constitutional rights for federal judicial intervention, the courts
have adopted differing approaches in reaching this result.
For example, in Zeller v. Dunegal School District Board of
Education, the Third Circuit overturned an earlier decision and
held that it would no longer review hair length regulations
0 6
because it believed that public school officials are better able
than the federal judiciary to determine proper school discipline
and decorum.0' The court justified its holding on the basis
100. See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text (discussing the tests
under which the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have examined
public school dress codes).
101. Zeller, 517 F.2d at 606-07 (determining that federal courts are ill-
equipped to examine a community's determination regarding appropriate
grooming for public school students).
102. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that there
is no constitutionally protected right to wear one's hair at the length one
chooses).
103. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217-19 (6th Cir. 1970) (reasoning that
regulation of hair length did not violate the First Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, or the right to privacy and as such, the school district's regulation
could not be reviewed by the federal courts).
104. King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (9th Cir.
1971) (holding that regulations on hair length in public schools do not infringe
on substantial constitutional rights and are therefore not reviewable by federal
courts).
105. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that
public school regulations on length of hair do not sharply implicate constitu-
tional values and therefore "are not cognizable in federal courts").
106. Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 607 (3d Cir.
1975). The court stated:
[Tihere are areas of state school regulation in which the federal courts
should not intrude. Without attempting to survey a bright line
between permissible and impermissible intervention, we conclude that
student hair cases fall on the side where the wisdom and experience of
school authorities must be deemed superior and preferable to the
federal judiciary's.
Id.
107. Id. The court based this determination on a concern "that the
proliferation of claims with exotic concepts of real or imagined constitutional
deprivations may very well dilute protections now assured basic rights." Id.
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that privacy rights and the right to liberty implicated in hair
length regulation cases are not sufficient to merit judicial
review.' In addition, the court expressed concern that
recognizing a freedom to personal liberty within public schools
would significantly interfere with the mission of the schools." 9
Because the Third Circuit refused to recognize constitutional
rights implicated by hair length regulations,"0 school officials
did not need to demonstrate that the regulations prevented
disruptions in the classroom.' Although the Third Circuit did
not address whether freedom of speech limits the scope of
permissible hair length regulations in public schools, the court's
expansive statement"2 that it will not review hair length
regulations implies that the court believes such rights are not
implicated.
The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits" 3 agree with
the Third Circuit that a personal liberty right is not violated by
public school hair length regulations, and have gone a step
further to find that such regulations do not violate freedom of
(footnote omitted). The court worried that unless this trend was reversed, the
Constitution might be trivialized. Id.
108. Id. at 607-08.
109. See id. at 606 (arguing that the nature of the school system inherently
limits students' personal freedoms in that the schools maintain the authority
to prescribe curriculum, assign faculty, promulgate rules of conduct, and set
grading standards).
110. Id. at 607.
111. See Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 606 (3d.
Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit described its decision as recognizing that limits
exist "to redressable allegations of constitutionally-protected personal liberty by
public school students." Id.
112. See supra note 106 (quoting the Zeller court as stating that "student
hair cases" fall within the jurisdiction of school authorities rather than the
federal judiciary).
113. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the
right to wear one's hair as one chooses in public schools is not protected by the
First Amendment); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971)
(holding that Tinker does not apply to regulations concerning hair length
because hair length is not "akin to pure speech" which contributes to the
"storehouse of ideas" but is at most "an expression of individuality"); King v.
Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932,937 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that
Tinker only applies to rights akin to "pure speech" and not to public school
regulations concerning "personal appearance, style of clothing, or deportment");
Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that the record
did not establish that the students disciplined for wearing their hair long chose
this style to convey a message).
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expression under the First Amendment." 4 These circuits
found that hair style, at least in the cases under review, did not
possess a sufficient communicative message to warrant pro-
tection by the First Amendment.
2. The Right to Govern One's Appearance
I In contrast to the view that federal courts are not the proper
forum for review of school hair length regulations, the First,
115
Fourth,"6 Seventh,"' and Eighth"8 Circuits concluded that
hair length regulations may be reviewed by federal courts.
These circuits found that a fundamental constitutional right
exists to govern one's appearance.
Although all four circuit courts determined that students
have a constitutionally protected right to govern their own
appearance, the courts did not clearly explain the nature of this
right nor the standard courts should use to examine regulations
affecting it. The First Circuit, for example, stated that this right
is not as fundamental as other rights protected by the Due
Process Clause." 9 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits 2 ' stated
114. See, e.g., King, 445 F.2d at 937 (finding that the regulation did not
conflict with freedom of speech because the "students [who violated the
regulation] were not purporting to say anything"); Jackson, 424 F.2d at 217
(stating that the record indicated that neither of the students disciplined for
violating the hair regulation had the intention to express an idea or point of
view); see also supra notes 53-71 (examining the First Amendment tests that
determine whether conduct has enough communicative value to warrant First
Amendment protection).
115. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding
that there exists a personal liberty under the Bill of Rights to control one's
appearance).
116. See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 781-83 (4th Cir. 1972) (examining
the varying approaches to determine whether hair length regulations are
constitutional and deciding that a personal right to govern one's appearance
exists).
117. See Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1974) (reasserting
that the right to wear one's hair at the length one chooses is a component of
personal freedom).
118. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that
students have a constitutionally protected right to govern their own appear-
ance).
119. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970) ("We do
not say that the governance of the length and style of one's hair is necessarily
so fundamental as those substantive rights already found implicit in the 'liberty'
assurance of the Due Process Clause.").
120. See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that
sufficient "proof of state interest" and "violation of the rights of others" could
demonstrate necessity for regulation); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d at 1075 ("[Tlhe
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that school administrators must demonstrate the necessity of
regulations that infringe upon this right. Under this standard,
the Eighth Circuit held that the suggestion that shorter hair
improves classroom performance or evidence of a few isolated
disruptions does not satisfy the school's burden. 12' Lastly, the
Seventh Circuit described this right as fundamental2 and
stated that schools have a "substantial burden of justification"
when they seek to limit the right.1"
Significantly, these courts did not find that First Amend-
ment rights were implicated in the cases which they decided."2
The First,'2 Fourth,126 and Eighth 27 Circuits stated that
the records under review contained no information that the
students who violated the hair regulations intended to convey a
message by their hair length. The Seventh Circuit did not even
address the issue."
The conflicting decisions by the federal circuit courts
regarding hair length regulations in the public schools further
demonstrate the uncertainty of the standard under which courts
should review dress codes. The circuit courts disagree about
whether federal courts should review dress codes which prescribe
the length of students' hair. Furthermore, even the circuits
finding judicial review appropriate were uncertain about the
level of scrutiny the regulations should receive.
school administration carries the burden of establishing the necessity of
infringing upon [the student's] freedom in order to carry out the educational
mission.").
121. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d at 1077.
122. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1970).
123. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 49 (7th Cir. 1974).
124. See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d at 783 (stating that the record did not
establish that the length of the students' hair was symbolic speech).
125. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d at 1283 ("W]e reject the notion that
plaintiffs hair length is of a sufficiently communicative character to warrant
the full protection of the First Amendment.").
126. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d at 783 (stating that the record did not
establish that the length of the students' hair was symbolic speech).
127. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding the First
Amendment claim to be without merit because the record did not establish that
hair length was symbolic speech).
128. See Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263-65 (7th Cir. 1970) (discussing
students' personal rights to control their appearance but not mentioning their
right to free speech).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRESS CODES IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Public school officials may take broad measures to create an
environment that is conducive to learning.129 Hence, public
schools may proscribe students' vulgar or disruptive expressive
conduct.'80 Nonetheless, when schools attempt to proscribe
political speech or a student's access to information, the
Supreme Court has imposed restrictions on the public schools'
ability to limit expression.' 8' This Part examines how these
limits apply to public school dress codes.
This Part contends that the First Amendment protects
student dress. Section A argues that the various frameworks for
the examination of school regulations affecting students'
appearance enunciated by the circuit courts provide an unsatis-
factory method for analyzing dress codes in the public schools.
First, a per se rule that school dress codes are beyond the scope
of judicial review is inappropriate because those codes may go
beyond the goal of maintaining the educational environment and
seek to limit unpopular views or political speech. Second, the
fundamental right framework does not provide enough flexibility
or guidance for school officials as to what may constitute a
legitimate school dress code. Section B proposes a method to
analyze school dress codes using established First Amendment
jurisprudence. The proposed method considers the expressive
element of the dress along with the context within which the
student sets forth the expression to determine the constitution-
ality of a given regulation.
A. RESOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL DRESS CODES: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE ALL OR
NOTHING STANDARDS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT
The federal circuit courts' current tests for the examination
of public school dress codes regulating hair length do not provide
a satisfactory model to resolve the constitutionality of clothing
129. See supra 72-96 and accompanying text (explaining the level of scrutiny
courts apply to restrictions on student speech).
130. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining that school
officials may proscribe vulgar or lewd speech).
131. See supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text (describing the constitu-




regulations in the public schools. The current positions defer too
much to public school administrators' authority to regulate
student appearance, impose too great a burden of substantiation
on school administrators to demonstrate the necessity of the
regulation, or provide too little guidance in differentiating
between constitutional and unconstitutional regulations.
1. The Hands-Off Approach: Abdicating the Judiciary's
Ability to Ensure the Protection of Students'
Constitutional Rights
The hands-off approach 32 for reviewing public school dress
codes could arguably find support in the inculcative theory of
education, which the Supreme Court has endorsed.'33 Because
the inculcative theory of education seeks to teach students
community values, this theory could support the judiciary's
deference to public school officials' decisions regarding com-
munity standards and appropriate regulations for the classroom.
Nonetheless, the hands-off approach ignores other Supreme
Court precedent, such as Tinker, which stand for the proposition
that the abdication of judicial review is not proper when
regulations implicate public school students' constitutional
rights.'" Furthermore, a failure to protect students' right to
freedom of expression runs counter to the inculcative theory of
education 3 in the sense that community values include
support for freedom of speech and expression as basic rights
protected under the Bill of Rights. A total abdication of
protection for students' right to freedom of speech and expression
would ignore this basic community value.'36
132. See supra notes 101-114 (discussing the position of several circuit courts
that the judiciary is not the proper forum to challenge school dress codes).
133. The Supreme Court has indicated that one mission of the public schools
is to instill community norms and values in students, and it is the mission of
school administrators to accomplish this task. See supra notes 76-96 and
accompanying text (overviewing Supreme Court decisions concerning student
expression in public classrooms which indicate that the Supreme Court believes
public schools should instill community values and standards in students).
134. See supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court decisions in which the Supreme Court has examined whether students'
constitutional rights were infringed).
135. See supra notes 76-80 (discussing the goals of the inculcative theory of
education and how that applies to First Amendment jurisprudence affecting the
public classroom).
136. See supra notes 33-35 (discussing some educators' concerns regarding
dress codes because they believe the codes hinder students' cognitive develop-
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Courts often find public school dress codes to fall within
constitutional limits because of school officials' broad powers to
control the educational environment. 13 7 This result does not,
however, support a per se rule that all public school dress codes
are constitutional. Like the Tinker armband prohibition, dress
codes can limit students' political speech or censor one particular
political view. 8" As such, complete judicial deference to school
officials' decisions regarding student dress is inappropriate.
2. The Fundamental Right Approach
The fundamental right to govern one's appearance, which
several circuit courts found when examining rules related to
student hair length, provides a substantial basis on which
students might contest dress codes. Dress codes differ from hair
regulations, however, because regulations governing dress do not
compel students to alter their physical beings.3 9 Clothes can
be changed after school; hair length cannot. Furthermore, the
fundamental right approach, which focused on personal auto-
nomy, disregards public support for giving school officials
authority to maintain an educational environment. School
officials have, and need, the authority to regulate student
autonomy to foster an educational environment.'40
The standards for substantiation enunciated under the
fundamental right approach also impose too great a burden for
school administrators and give insufficient guidance about which
dress codes may be constitutional. For example, three circuit
courts that found a fundamental right to govern one's appear-
ance required a "substantial burden of justification" by the
school district." Such a high standard, however, would
ment).
137. See supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to
which First Amendment jurisprudence applies in the public schools).
138. See supra notes 81-90, 94-96 and accompanying text (describing the
Supreme Court's determination that schools may not regulate student political
speech).
139. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text (explaining the grounds
on which circuit courts finding a fundamental right to govern one's appearance
based their decisions).
140. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing school
officials' authority to regulate student conduct to maintain an appropriate
educational environment).
141. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 49 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Massie v.
Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (requiring sufficient "proof of state
interest" to uphold a hair length regulation); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069,
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contradict Supreme Court precedent which acknowledges that
school officials have an interest in maintaining an educational
environment conducive to learning and in teaching students
community norms." In addition, because little case law exists
on the right to govern one's appearance, school officials would
lack guidance for determining constitutionally permissible dress
codes.
B. RECOGNIZING THE EXPRESSIVE CONTENT OF DRESS:
ANALYZING DRESS CODES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The fundamental right jurisprudence developed to analyze
hair regulations provides an inappropriate framework for
determining the constitutionality of public school dress codes.
In contrast, freedom of speech jurisprudence provides an
appropriate basis for determining the limits on public school
officials' authority to proscribe student dress. The basis of
analyzing school dress codes under freedom of expression
jurisprudence, however, hinges on first establishing that dress
may be the type of conduct which constitutes symbolic speech.
1. Dress Is Expressive Conduct Warranting First
Amendment Protection
Although courts that examined hair length regulations
dismissed the First Amendment challenges to the regulations
because the students had not established that hair style was
intended to convey a message," several circuit courts ac-
knowledged that hairstyles could be symbolic speech if the
student established that the hairstyle was intended to convey a
message beyond style."' Significantly, in the context of dress,
1075) (8th Cir. 1971) (placing the burden on the administration to establish that
the regulation is necessary).
142. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the inculcative
theory of education and Supreme Court decisions which have adopted this
theory).
143. See supra notes 101-128 and accompanying text (discussing the various
circuit courts' analyses of the constitutionality of hair regulations).
144. E.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) ("Perhaps the
length of one's hair may be symbolic speech which under some circumstances
is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment."); Bishop v. Colaw, 450
F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971) (rejecting the First Amendment claim since "the
record contains no evidence suggesting that [the student's] hairstyle represented
a symbolic expression of any kind"); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283
(1st Cir. 1970) ("We recognize that there may be an element of expression and
speech involved in one's choice of hair length and style, if only the expression
7371996]
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several courts have recognized that dress can qualify as conduct
that meets the standard of symbolic speech when the dress
conveys a message beyond fashion. 45
The context in which regulations limiting conduct are made
is one indicator of whether the offending conduct is expres-
sive."4 This indicator suggests that many public schools are
regulating certain types of dress precisely because those types of
clothing convey a message, albeit a message the school may wish
to discourage. 47 Of course, whether school officials may be
justified in discouraging those messages is yet another issue.
School dress codes, especially those that proscribe certain
types of clothing, often regulate types of dress based solely on
the message. These regulations include dress codes that prohibit
the wearing of gang colors or other gang-associated clothing,
sexually provocative clothing, clothing with insignias, logos, or
words, as well as expensive clothing.4 ' For example, school
administrators often justify dress codes because the codes
prevent misunderstandings of gang membership, thereby
protecting unsuspecting students and preventing the intimi-
dation of other students. 49 This justification demonstrates
that various messages may be conveyed by the prohibited
clothing, although the message may be different depending upon
the viewer. One viewer sees the clothes as representing style,
another feels threatened, while yet another recognizes member-
ship. The ability of dress to convey different messages to
different groups of students, however, justifies a conclusion that
the dress contains communicative content.50
of disdain for conventionality.").
145. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (noting that the Court
previously found the wearing of military uniforms to protest the Vietnam War
symbolic speech in Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)); see also supra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing some courts' findings that dress
is symbolic speech).
146. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis of how to determine whether conduct measures up to symbolic
speech worthy of First Amendment protection).
147. See supra notes 20-43 and accompanying text (discussing justifications
and concerns behind public school dress codes).
148. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing school dress
codes which prohibit expensive, vulgar, or lewd clothing as well as clothing
which is "gang-related").
149. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing school
officials' justifications for dress codes).
150. See supra notes 57-71 (describing the Supreme Court's analysis to
determine whether symbolic speech receives First Amendment protection).
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The expressed goals of public school administrators indicate
that gang-related clothing must be regulated to prevent ex-
pression of the underlying messages. The clothing, therefore, is
symbolic speech understood by the student audience. 5' Simi-
larly, dress codes that prohibit sexually provocative clothing or
clothing with insignias or logos also may seek to regulate the
message of the clothing, indicating that those types of dress may
constitute symbolic speech.
2. Determining the Limits on Permissible Public School
Dress Codes
Because dress often satisfies the requirements for symbolic
speech, the First Amendment limits public school officials' ability
to impose dress codes. 52  Despite these limitations, public
school administrators retain broad powers to restrict speech in
the classroom that interferes with its educational mission.' 53
This section proposes an analysis for dress codes in the public
schools that balances the interest in maintaining the educational
environment of the classroom against public school students'
First Amendment rights.
To determine the constitutionality of dress codes, courts
should first examine whether the dress is symbolic speech. If
the dress is not symbolic speech, it does not receive First
Amendment protection. If the dress is symbolic speech, however,
courts should make a further inquiry into whether there are
cause and effect justifications for prohibiting the speech. If there
are no such justifications, the speech receives protection. On the
other hand, if there are such justifications, courts will need to
balance those justifications against the infringement on students'
speech.
a. Applying the First Amendment Analysis to Dress Codes
School dress codes frequently prohibit students from
151. See supra notes 59-67 (setting forth the factors which determine the
types of speech constituting symbolic speech).
152. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text (examining current First
Amendment tests to determine whether government regulations of speech are
constitutional). Public school students have limited constitutional rights,
including First Amendment rights, while in the classroom. Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
153. See supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of the First Amendment in public classrooms).
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wearing buttons, certain colors, or clothing with writing. 54
Many of these dress codes are aimed at limiting the wearing of
"gang' clothing in school. In addition to showing membership in
a gang, however, gang styles may also have an underlying
political message, such as affiliation with a particular spokes-
person or group. As such, gang clothing may qualify as symbolic
speech.
In a school with documented prior gang associated violence,
prohibitions on such clothing to maintain the educational
environment are likely constitutional even if the gang styles
qualify as symbolic speech.'55 Under Tinker, however, school
officials must show a "reason to anticipate" actual disruption of
the classroom, not merely an "undifferentiated fear" that
disruption may occur.5 6 Assuming that the clothing causes
actual disruption, school officials have a significant interest in
preventing future violence and providing a non-intimidating
atmosphere for students.'57 As such, the interest in maintain-
ing a learning-conducive educational environment outweighs the
students' free speech rights.
In contrast, prohibitions on gang styles that qualify as
symbolic speech would be unconstitutional in schools with no
documented gang-associated classroom disruption. Because
there are no present problems necessitating the restrictions, the
need for the regulation is merely hypothetical. Such regulations
appear to aim at precisely what the Supreme Court has pro-
hibited-regulating speech because of its associated unpleasant-
ness, or the possibility that classroom disruption or violence
might ensue.'58 In the absence of detrimental effects on the
classroom environment, students' free speech rights prevail.'59
154. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (describing school dress
codes that prohibit certain colors or clothing with writing and others that
mandate particular types of clothing).
155. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
156. Id. at 509 n.3, 510, 513 (stating that material disruption as a result of
the symbolic speech must occur before the regulation is constitutional and that
a mere fear of disruption does not meet this standard).
157. Another case in which a school's interest in maintaining an educational
environment may outweigh a student's free speech rights occurs when a student
wears a T-shirt, for example, which says, "Legalize Pot." Although this
statement is probably symbolic speech which is political in nature and would
normally receive First Amendment protection, because of the school's goal of
preventing student drug use, the school could prohibit the T-shirt.
158. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1989).
159. Id. at 509.
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b. The Benefits and Disadvantages of Using a First
Amendment Analysis
The First Amendment analysis of school dress codes
honestly weighs the competing interests that restrictions on
student dress implicate. Although First Amendment analysis
might give differing results for the same dress code depending
upon the location of the speech, 160 this characteristic alone
does not evidence that student speech expressed through dress
should not receive First Amendment protection. Instead, this
characteristic results because the context in which speech occurs
determines whether it is symbolic and whether actual disruption
is necessary to justify restrictions on student speech under
Tinker. By examining these factors, this analysis ensures that
limits on school officials' powers are not too stringent and
permissible restrictions on student speech are not overly broad.
This analysis also provides beneficial guidance for school
officials creating dress codes because it forces them to confront
their justifications for implementing dress codes. Under this
analysis, dress codes which are justified on hypothetical
problems are not constitutional. Those codes which are justified
on documented problems are constitutional if the interest in
maintaining an educational environment outweighs students'
free speech rights. Although whether a public school dress code
is constitutional under the First Amendment frequently will
depend on the significance of public school officials'justifications
for the restrictions, First Amendment jurisprudence is suffi-
ciently developed to offer adequate guidance to school of-
ficials. 16' Furthermore, even though this analysis does not
create a "bright line," this attribute is a necessary result of the
conflicting interests at issue. As stated earlier, the fact that the
analysis considers conflicting interests does not dictate that the
analysis is flawed.
Even though judges lack expertise in the field of education,
160. Differing results for the protection of speech also occur under the public
forum doctrine of First Amendment jurisprudence. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text (discussing First Amendment tests for time, place and
manner and public forum restrictions).
161. Several Supreme Court cases have considered the limits of the
restriction of student speech in the classroom. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S.
503; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Board of Educ. V. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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judicial scrutiny of dress codes is essential to maintain students'
rights to freedom of expression. Because free speech is highly
valued, protecting student speech is consistent with the
inculcative theory of education. 162  Protecting student free
speech models for students an important community value-the
right to speak freely without fear of overly burdensome govern-
mental regulation.16  Moreover, limiting judicial scrutiny to
cases in which symbolic speech is involved and where school
officials do not have an actual justification narrows the type of
dress codes which will receive judicial scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Public school dress codes, although a seemingly benevolent
cure for the ails of the public school system, may often unconsti-
tutionally restrict students' right to free speech. Significantly,
the circuit courts have not yet agreed upon a standard to
examine the constitutionality of these regulations. The stan-
dards that have been set forth, however, either give too much
deference to school officials or fail to consider adequately the
needs of maintaining a productive educational environment.
Courts should examine the constitutionality of dress codes
using a First Amendment jurisprudence that addresses symbolic
speech and student free speech rights. Considering whether a
type of dress meets the standards for the protection of symbolic
speech ensures that courts will not have to continually review
school officials'judgments. Furthermore, by examining whether
a dress code has legitimate purposes, or is instead an attempt to
suppress unpopular views, courts will be protecting students'
First Amendment rights.
162. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing the clash
between the inculcative theory of education and restrictions on student speech).
163. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1989).
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